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DISPARITY IN DEATH SENTENCING FOR FELONY
MURDERERS CREATED BY CABANA v. BULLOCK
The eighth amendment protects defendants convicted of a criminal offense
from "cruel and unusual punishment."' The framers of the Constitution,
however, never defined what they meant by "cruel and unusual, ' 2 and the
Supreme Court has never delineated an exact list of punishments which
would violate the amendment.3 Instead, the Court reviews a punishment
alleged to be cruel and unusual against the backdrop of history and current
societal and legislative attitudes.4
In 1982, the Supreme Court held that the eighth amendment prohibits the
imposition of a death sentence on a person convicted of felony murder
where there is no finding of personal culpability.5 This procedural safeguard
followed ten years of Court decisions which upheld the constitutionality of
the death penalty6 but struck down statutes which did not fulfill the eighth
amendment's goal of fundamental respect for humanity. 7 During those ten
1. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." U.S. CoNsr. amend. VIII. The eighth amendment is made applicable
to the states by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 241 (1972); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962). The eighth amendment
also proscribes the judicial imposition of cruel and unusual punishment. Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 378-82 (1910).
2. Furman, 408 U.S. at 258-68 (Brennan, J., concurring) (there was little evidence of the
framers' intent); Weems, 217 U.S. at 368 (cruel and unusual clause received very little debate
in Congress); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1879) (it is difficult to define the cruel
and unusual provision).
3. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 276 n.20. As of 1958, the Supreme Court had not given the
cruel and unusual clause a precise meaning. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958). See also
Weems, 217 U.S. at 368 ("What constitutes cruel and unusual punishment has not been exactly
decided."). For a discussion of the Supreme Court's role in shaping the eighth amendment see
generally Goldberg & Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 HAv. L.
REV. 1773, 1777 (1970) ("both precedent and established principle are somewhat meager ....
[the] cruel and unusual punishment doctrine is not well developed.").
4. See infra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
5. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). See infra notes 79-94 and accompanying text.
6. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (upheld death penalty as constitutional). Gregg's
companion cases provided a framework for assessing the constitutionality of a capital punish-
ment statute. Both Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) and Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262
(1976) upheld the statutes because they provided guidelines to aid the jury in its decision of
whether or not the convicted murderer and his crime warrant the death penalty. See infra notes
39-57 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Enmund, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (prohibits imposition of death penalty on a
person convicted of felony murder in absence of finding personal culpability); Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U.S. 586 (1978) (prohibits capital punishment when there is no individualized consideration
of mitigating factors); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (death as punishment for rape
of adult woman is unconstitutional); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (mandatory
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years, the Supreme Court determined that the eighth amendment requires
individualized consideration of the defendant and his offense as a constitu-
tionally indispensable part of the sentencing process.8 Individualized sen-
tencing requires the sentencer to consider aggravating and mitigating
circumstances and, thereby, identify those defendants whose crimes and
personal characteristics warrant a sentence of death. 9
In 1986, the Court determined that individualized consideration of a
defendant's personal culpability by the sentencer is not constitutionally
mandated for a person convicted of felony murder.l° The Court in Cabana
v. Bullock held that a determination that a felony murderer neither killed,
attempted to kill, intended that a killing take place, nor intended that lethal
force be used, is a sentencing limitation appropriate for a proportionality
review." The Court decided that a finding of personal culpability is not an
aggravating or mitigating circumstance, and such a finding is not necessary
to impose the death sentence.12
This Note examines the procedural safeguards created by the Supreme
Court to protect a person convicted of murder from an unconstitutional
sentence of death and argues that the constitutional safeguards which apply
to deliberate murderers do not necessarily protect persons convicted of felony
murder. Additionally, this Note compares the Court's decision in Bullock
with past decisions to illustrate the erosion of procedural safeguards in
capital cases. Finally, this Note suggests that states must take affirmative
action to protect defendants from inequitable death sentencing procedures.
I. BACKGROUND
The death penalty has been used to punish serious offenders since the
founding of this country. 3 However, the procedures surrounding the sen-
tencing and execution of offenders have evolved over the years 4 as the
death sentences are unconstitutional); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (man-
datory death sentences are unconstitutional); Furman, 408 U.S. 238 (capital punishment statute
which left complete discretion with judge or jury is unconstitutional). But see McGautha v.
California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971) (it was not unconstitutional to leave complete discretion with
the jury).
8. See infra notes 42-63 and accompanying text.
9. Id.
10. Cabana v. Bullock, 106 S. Ct. 689 (1986).
11. Id. at 697.
12. Id.
13. Two Supreme Court decisions trace the history of the death penalty. See Furman, 408
U.S. at 242-52 (Douglas, J., concurring); Id. at 258-69 (Brennan, J., concurring); Id. at 316-
40 (Marshall, J., concurring); Id. at 376-84 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Id. at 401-10 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting); Id. at 419-28 (Powell, J., dissenting); McGautha, 402 U.S. at 197-203.
14. Furman, 408 U.S. at 296-300 (Brennan, J., concurring) (procedures have changed over
the years and punishment by death has been restricted). McGautha details the history of capital
punishment under English law and American statutory developments. 402 U.S. at 197-203. See
also infra note 42 (listing cases which have modified application of the death penalty).
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Supreme Court uses the eighth and fourteenth amendments to modify state
death penalty statutes.1" Although the Court acknowledges the unique char-
acter of death as a punishment,1 6 analytically it treats it as any other penalty.
In its analysis, the Court considers the history of the penalty, legislative
intent, international opinion, jury verdicts, and current social attitudes. 17
These factors are important but not conclusive." In the final instance the
Supreme Court alone decides whether or not the imposition of death is a
constitutional punishment. 1 9
15. See infra note 42.
16. Furman, 408 U.S. at 286-93 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Death is a unique punishment
in the United States .... This Court, too, almost always treats death cases as a class apart.")
(footnote omitted); Id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("death differs from all other forms of
criminal punishment"); Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605 ("the imposition of death by public authority
is so profoundly different from all other penalties"); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 ("death is
qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment").
17. See, e.g., Enmund, 458 U.S. at 788-89 (before making its finding [the Supreme Court]
looks to the "historical development of the punishment . . ., legislative judgments, international
opinion, and the sentencing decisions juries have made"); Coker, 433 U.S. 584, 593 (1977)
(Court looked to history and "the objective evidence of the country's present judgment
concerning the acceptability of death"); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 175 (contemporary standards and
legislative judgments are part of constitutionality test); Woodson, 428 U.S. 280, 288 (1976) (to
apply the eighth amendment the Court considers contemporary standards and social values
evidenced by history and usage of the punishment, legislative enactments, and jury determi-
nations); McGautha, 402 U.S. at 198 (American society will not accept common law rule
requiring mandatory death sentences for all convicted murders).
18. See Goldberg & Dershowitz, supra note 3, at 1780. Goldberg and Dershowitz found
three objective indicators emphasized by Supreme Court decisions: "historic usage of particular
punishments, statutory authorization in other jurisdictions, and general public opinion." Id.
(footnotes omitted). They concluded:
Were these three criteria of the prevailing standards of decency the final test of
constitutionality under the eighth amendment, the death penalty would probably
survive constitutional scrutiny. If long usage of a penalty is determinative of its
constitutionality, capital punishment would be permissible because it has been
employed in America since the colonial years, although with decreasing frequency.
Similarly, if the eighth amendment condemns only punishments which are on the
statute books of almost no jurisdiction other than the one before the Court, the
death penalty, of course, could not be declared unconstitutional .... And the
American people are still divided on capital punishment. Fewer support the death
penalty than in the early 1950's, but about half of the public ... approve the
penalty.
Id. at 1781 (footnotes omitted). However, the authors conclude that these three tests cannot
be the final word, but are merely the threshold inquiry. They point out that on three occasions
the Court has struck down penalties as unconstitutional which had deep historical roots. In
addition the Court has struck down a penalty that was on the books of a number of states
and that the public supported. Id. at 1782.
19. See Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797 ("it is for us ultimately to judge whether the Eighth
Amendment permits imposition of the death penalty"); Coker, 433 U.S. at 197 ("in the end"
the Supreme Court will decide whether the death penalty is acceptable by eighth amendment
standards).
However, the Supreme Court has established that federal courts play a "limited role" in
applying the eighth amendment. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 174 (citing Furman, 408 U.S. 238). The
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The eighth amendment was adopted in 1791 as a response to pressure
from various state representatives called upon to ratify the Federal Consti-
tution30 Neither the framers of the amendment nor early Supreme Court
decisions questioned the constitutionality of capital punishment. 21 Instead
they were concerned with the infliction of torture and "lingering" death. 22
The eighth amendment, however, has come to mean more than a proscription
of torture and barbarous acts 3.2  Recent Supreme Court decisions describe
the amendment as "flexible and dynamic" 24 and hold that it "drawls] its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of
eighth amendment often involves a conflict between the legislature and the judiciary as to
constitutional requirements. Furman, 408 U.S. at 313-14. Federalism concerns require the federal
courts to defer to the state legislatures. Id. at 465-70. The federal courts have a responsibility
to make sure that the Constitution is not violated, but its judges are not "legislators." Gregg,
428 U.S. at 175. Federal courts are to "presume" the validity of the punishments chosen by
elected state legislators. Id.
20. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 169 n.17. For an interesting history of the meaning of "cruel and
unusual," see generally Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted": The
Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. Rav. 839 (1969) (taken from English common law).
21. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 168-69. Until Furman, the Court did not confront directly the claim
that death was per se unconstitutional and Furman did not resolve the issue. Id. See infra notes
30-36 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464 (1947) (second
electrocution attempt did not violate the eighth amendment because there was no intentional
infliction of unnecessary pain); O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339 (1892) (Field, J.,
dissenting) (barbaric punishments are condemned by history, i.e., tortures such as the rack,
thumb-screw, iron boot, and stretching of limbs); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890)
(cruel punishments involve torture or lingering death); Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 136 (upheld
shooting as a method of execution because, unlike torture, it did not inflict unnecessary cruelty
and was a "traditional punishment").
23. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 171. The Supreme Court has held that the eighth amendment draws
"its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society." Trop, 356 U.S. at 101. This means that the Court will apply eighth amendment
principles even where the punishment is not barbarous. See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S.
277, 284 (1983) (eighth amendment proscribes "sentences that are disproportionate to the crime
committed"); Furman, 408 U.S. at 256-57 ("discretionary statutes are unconstitutional");
Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667 (law which makes drug addiction a crime inflicts cruel and unusual
punishment and violates the fourteenth amendment); Trop, 356 U.S. at 101 (denationalization
is forbidden by the eighth amendment); Weems, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (the meaning of cruel and
unusual takes on new meaning as society becomes enlightened).
O'Neil, 144 U.S. 323 (1892) was the first time a defendant used the argument that a
punishment was excessive at oral argument before the Supreme Court. The majority held against
the defendant because he had not properly raised the argument in his briefs and because, at
that time, the eighth amendment did not apply to the states. Id. However, Justice Field argued
in dissent that 19,914 days in prison for the conviction of 307 separate offenses of selling
intoxicating liquor was excessive in view of the crime and, therefore, unconstitutional. Id. at
339-41, 364-65.
24. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 171. "[A] principle to be vital, must be capable of wider application
than the mischief which gave it birth .... [The Eighth Amendment] is not fastened to the
obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice."
Id. (quoting Weems, 217 U.S. at 373, 378).
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a maturing society. ' ' 25 There are a number of principles that guide the Court
in finding a punishment cruel and unusual. A punishment must not be
degrading to human dignity, 26 inflicted in an arbitrary fashion, 27 unacceptable
to society, 2 nor totally unnecessary. 29
In 1972, the Court began struggling with the constitutionality of the death
penalty.30 Generally, the debate over the death penalty has two issues. First,
is the death penalty cruel and unusual per se?3 Second, if it is not cruel
and unusual per se, is it cruel and unusual as applied?
3 2
25. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101. See also Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 288 (1976)
("Central to the application of the [eighth] Amendment is a determination of contemporary
standards regarding the infliction of punishment.").
26. Furman, 408 U.S. at 281. Justice Brennan's concurring opinion stated that he considered
human dignity to be the primary principle which lays the foundation for other principles. Id.
He explained that more than physical pain must be considered in whether a punishment's
extreme severity is degrading to human dignity. Id. at 272.
The Gregg majority stated that a penalty must be consistent with the dignity of man, the
"basic concept underlying the eighth amendment." 428 U.S. at 173 (quoting Trop, 356 U.S.
at 100). The Gregg Court found that the "dignity of man" standard requires that the punishment
not be excessive. Id. The Court broke the excessiveness inquiry into two parts; first, the
punishment must not be unnecessary and wanton and, second, the punishment must not be
grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime. Id.
Earlier cases held that execution by shooting (Wilkerson, 99 U.S. 130 (1879)) or electrocution
(Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436) (1890)) was not excessive. Even where the first attempt at electrocution
was unsuccessful, a second attempt was not excessive. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
27. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206. The Court in Gregg upheld the capital statute because it allowed
for an appellate review to prevent "random or arbitrary imposition of the death penalty." Id.
Justice Brennan's concurrence in Furman stated that the words "cruel and unusual" imply the
condemnation of arbitrarily imposed punishments. 408 U.S. at 274.
28. Furman, 408 U.S. at 277, 281. The Gregg majority found that an assessment of current
values was relevant to an eighth amendment inquiry. 428 U.S. at 173. But the Gregg Court
noted that public opinion is not conclusive and that even though society may be willing to
accept a certain punishment, the Court must decide whether it accords with the dignity of man.
Id.
29. Furman, 408 U.S. at 281. Justice Brennan equated excessiveness with the needless
infliction of suffering. Id. at 279.
30. Furman, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
31. This question was resolved in the negative four years later in Gregg, 428 U.S. at 170.
See infra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
Only three punishments have been declared unconstitutional per se. In 1910 the Court found
the Philippine punishment of cadena temporal (imprisonment for at least twelve years, in chains,
at hard and painful labor, loss of many basic civil rights, and lifetime surveillance) to be
unconstitutional because it lacked proportion to the crime of falsifying an official document.
Weems, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). In 1958 the Court held that a defendant who escaped from a
military jail and "deserted for less than a day" could not be divested of his citizenship. Trop,
356 U.S. 86 (1958). The Court held that the punishment, while not excessive, was forbidden
by the eighth amendment guarantee of humane treatment. Id. It is interesting to note that the
Trop Court, in dicta, reasoned that divestment was not excessive because wartime desertion
was punishable by death. Id. at 100. The third time the Supreme Court found a punishment
cruel and unusual was in 1962 when it struck down a state statute which made drug addiction
19881
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When the Supreme Court decided Furman v. Georgia, it was presented
with an opportunity to decide whether or not capital punishment is cruel
and unusual per se. However, it did not resolve this issue.3" Instead, the
Court struck down the Georgia capital punishment statute on the ground
that it was unconstitutional as applied. The five to four decision found that
the sentencing procedure gave too much unguided discretion to the jury.14
The Court held that this discretion would result in arbitrary sentencing
practices which would violate the eighth amendment.3" Because Furman did
not definitively decide the per se constitutionality issue, there was confusion
among the states as to the status of the death penalty. 6
Four years later37 the Court relied on two centuries of precedent38 to hold
that death is not cruel and unusual as defined by the eighth amendment.3 9
The Court also determined that Georgia's revised statute was not cruel and
unusual as applied because it required the jury to consider aggravating and
mitigating circumstances 4O and provided for a proportionality review by the
a criminal offense. Robinson, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). The Court concluded that it was cruel and
unusual to impose any punishment at all for the mere status of drug addiction. Id. at 667.
32. The Furman Court resolved the issue on this ground. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). See infra
notes 33-36.
33. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 169. Four Justices would have held the death penalty "not
unconstitutional" in all cases; two would have reached the opposite conclusion; three left the
question unanswered. Id. There were nine separate opinions in Furman with five opinions
supporting the holding. As such, the opinions of Justices White and Stewart, concurring on
the narrowest grounds, may be viewed as the position of the Court. Id. at 169 n.15.
34. 408 U.S. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring) (discretionary statutes are unconstitutional
"in their operation"); Id. at 295 (Brennan, J., concurring) (attacked procedures previously held
unconstitutional stating that "this Court has held that juries may ... impose a death sentence
wholly unguided by standards governing that decision."); Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring)
("the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate ... [the death penalty] to be so
wantonly and freakishly imposed."); Id. at 314 (White, J., concurring) ("[Tlhe legislative
judgment ... loses much of its force when viewed in light of the recurring practice of delegating
sentencing authority to the jury and the fact that a jury, in its own discretion ... may refuse
to impose the death penalty no matter what the circumstances of the crime.").
35. Furman, 408 U.S. at 256-57. Justice Douglas concurred and stated that the discretionary
statute was unconstitutional in its operation and was "pregnant with discrimination." He
explained that discrimination does not comport with equal protection under the laws and is
banned by the cruel and unusual clause. Id. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
36. See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 599-600 (Furman "engendered confusion"). See, e.g., Wood-
son, 428 U.S. at 298 (post-Furman statutes reflected states' attempts to retain capital punishment
within constitutional boundaries. Differences among statutes are attributable to "diverse readings
of this Court's multi-opinioned decision in that case."); Roberts, 428 U.S. at 331 (Louisiana
responded to Furman by removing all jury discretion and mandating death for certain crimes).
37. Gregg, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
38. Id. at 177-78.
39. Id. at 187. The Gregg Court held that "the death penalty is not a form of punishment
that may never be imposed, regardless of the circumstances of the offense, regardless of the
character of the offender, and regardless of the procedure followed in reaching the decision to
impose it." Id.
40. Id. at 196-97, 207.
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Georgia Supreme Court. 41 in the four companion cases to Gregg v. Georgia , 42
the Court explained what is constitutionally required of a capital punishment
statute. 43 Jurek v. Texas" and Proffitt v. Florida45 upheld as constitutional
two capital statutes which required that the jury consider mitigating factors.
The Florida statute required the trial judge to weigh eight aggravating
circumstances against seven mitigating circumstances before sentencing the
defendant to death4 6 The Texas statute did not make explicit reference to
mitigating factors but it required the jury to consider three questions in the
sentencing process.47 The statute was upheld because the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals had broadly interpreted it as permitting the sentencer to
consider any mitigating factors the defendant presented through the evalu-
ation of the three questions.8
On the other hand, the Court found statutes that mandated death for
certain crimes, as in Louisiana49 and North Carolina, 0 to be in violation of
the eighth amendment because they lacked standards to guide the jury in its
decision of which defendants will live and which will die." Louisiana and
41. Id. at 198, 207.
42. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 274-75 (capital statute upheld because it guided jury in selection of
which defendants were capable of being put to death); Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 260 (capital statute
upheld because its procedures assure death will not "be 'wantonly' or 'freakishly' imposed");
Roberts, 428 U.S. at 335-36 (mandatory death penalty struck down because it did not guide
jury in selection of which defendants were capable of being put to death and did not provide
any meaningful appellate review); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 302-04 (mandatory death sentence
struck down because it gave the jury standardless sentencing power).
43. It should be noted that only Justices Stevens, Powell, and Stewart joined in all four of
these plurality opinions. Justices Brennan and Marshall concurred in Roberts and Woodson
which struck down the capital statutes, while Justices White, Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Chief
Justice Burger dissented. In Jurek and Proffitt, each a seven to two decision to uphold the
capital statutes, only Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented.
44. Jurek, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
45. Proffitt, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
46. Id. at 248 n.6.
47. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 269.' The three considerations were:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased was
committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the
deceased or another would result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts
of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the
deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased.
Id. (quoting TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. AN. art. 37.071(b) (Vernon Supp. 1975-1976)).
48. Id.
49. Roberts, 428 U.S. 325 (1976). Louisiana's statute replaced jury discretion with mandatory
death sentences for all persons convicted of first degree murder, aggravated rape, aggravated
kidnapping, or treason. Id. at 331.
50. Woodson, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). North Carolina's statute defined first degree murder as
a deliberate murder or a murder committed or attempted during the commission of arson,
rape, robbery, burglary, or other felony. Id. at 285 n.4. It required the death penalty for
anyone found guilty of one of those crimes. Id.
51. Id. at 303.
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North Carolina had revised their capital statutes in response to Furman. 2
Because each state legislature interpreted Furman as prohibiting any discre-
tion in the sentencing process, they required the sentencer to impose death
if the defendant was found guilty of first degree murder, without any
consideration of aggravating or mitigating factors."
Taken together, Gregg and its companion cases reveal that a slim majority
of the Court14 is concerned with the procedural aspects of a death sentence."
The Woodson v. North Carolina majority acknowledged that the Constitu-
tion does not require an individualized sentencing policy.56 However, it
concluded that the eighth amendment's goal of fundamental respect for
humanity requires individualized consideration of the defendant and the
offense "as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process" of imposing
death as a punishment.5 7
The Court reinforced this concern of fundamental respect for humanity
in Lockett v. Ohio" and Bell v. Ohio59 when it struck down a capital
punishment statute which restricted the sentencer's consideration to three
mitigating circumstances. 60 The Court considered this a violation of the
52. Roberts, 428 U.S. at 331; Woodson, 428 U.S. at 285-86.
53. Roberts, 428 U.S. at 331; Woodson, 428 U.S. at 285-86.
54. See supra note 43.
55. This concern is due to the perception that the death penalty is "qualitatively different"
from imprisonment and, therefore, requires a "corresponding difference" in the need for
reliability in the decision making process. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304.
The dissenting Justices, Blackmun, White, Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger, do not
believe that a consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors is ever needed once a defendant
is properly found guilty. Id. at 321-24; Roberts, 428 U.S. at 354-58. See supra note 46.
56. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304.
57. Id. The Court based this conclusion on the predicate that death is qualitatively different
from imprisonment, and as a result, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability
in the decision that death is the appropriate punishment. Id. But see Woodson, 428 U.S. at
322-23 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist's dissent stated that individualized sen-
tencing is not constitutionally required. Id. He explained that once the defendant is found guilty
of first degree murder the inquiry into the cruel and unusual clause should cease because the
punishment of death has been found constitutional. Id. at 323-24. Justice Rehnquist would not
bring "desirable procedural guarantees" into the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Id. at 324. He agreed with the plurality that death is not cruel and unusual for the crime
committed by these defendants and would affirm the sentence because there was no indication
that the trial procedure fell short of constitutional standards. Id.
58. 438 U.S. 586 (1978). In Lockett, a felony murder defendant's participation in a robbery
during which someone was killed, was limited to driving the getaway car. Id. She was convicted
of aggravated murder and sentenced to death. Id. The Court could have treated this case as it
did Enmund and refused to sentence someone to death where there was no finding of personal
culpability. However, it instead found the statute unconstitutional because it did not allow the
jury to consider all mitigating circumstances. Id. See infra notes 79-86 and accompanying text.
59. 438 U.S. 637 (1978). Bell was convicted of aggravated murder because a murder was
committed during the course of a kidnapping perpetrated by Bell and a co-defendant. Id.
60. The Ohio capital statute required the trial judge to impose the death sentence if the
jury returned a verdict of aggravated murder without specifications, unless he found one of
three mitigating factors. 438 U.S. at 593. The three mitigating factors were: did the victim
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eighth amendment because it did not provide for broad individualized con-
sideration. 6' The majority acknowledged that the Constitution does not
require an individualized sentence but concluded that, since public policy
created acceptance of individualized sentencing in noncapital cases, individ-
ualized consideration is "essential in capital cases." 62 The Court distinguished
the statutes in Jurek and Proffitt as containing nonexclusive lists of mitigating
factors, while the Ohio statute presented an exclusive list of factors. 63
In 1977 the Court considered the constitutionality of a Georgia statute
which allowed a state court to sentence a defendant to death for the crime
of aggravated rape. 64 The Coker v. Georgia Court held that death was
completely disproportionate to the crime of rape because the victim was not
deprived of life. 65 In reaching this decision, the Court examined public
opinion, as expressed through the state legislature, and concluded that the
general populace did not approve of death as a penalty for rape. 6" The Court
also found that the vast majority of juries were not willing to sentence
someone convicted of rape to death. 67
Until 1982 the Court did not consider specifically the constitutionality of
a death sentence imposed on a person convicted of felony murder under the
theory of accomplice liability.68 Because the purpose of the felony murder
induce or facilitate the offense; was the defendant coerced or under duress or strong provocation;
or was the offense the result of the defendant's psychosis or mental deficiency. Id.
61. 438 U.S. at 604 ("[W]e conclude that the eighth and fourteenth amendments require
that the sentencer . . . not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect
of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense ....
(emphasis in original).
62. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 594-605. ("Given that the imposition of death by public authority
is so profoundly different from all other penalties, we cannot avoid the conclusion that an
individualized decision is essential in capital cases.").
63. Id. at 606-07.
64. Coker, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
65. Id. at 598.
66. 433 U.S. at 594. After the states redrafted their statutes to conform with Furman,
"none of the States that had not previously authorized death for rape chose to include rape
among capital felonies." Id. There were sixteen states that had included rape as a capital felony
before Furman, but only three states (Georgia, North Carolina, and Louisiana) included the
rape of an adult woman in their revised statutes. Id. In North Carolina and Louisiana the
death penalty was mandatory and the statutes were invalidated by Woodson, 428 U.S. 280
(1976) and Roberts, 428 U.S. 325 (1976). When Louisiana and North Carolina revised their
capital statutes for the second time, they did not include rape. Coker, 433 U.S. at 594. When
the Coker case was before the Supreme Court, Georgia was the only state authorizing the death
penalty for the rape of an adult woman. Id. at 595. Mississippi and Florida included rape as
a capital crime where the victim was a child. Id. at 595-96.
67. Coker, 433 U.S. at 596-97 (in nine out of ten cases the jury has not imposed the death
sentence on a defendant convicted of rape).
68. The crime of felony murder does not include intent to kill or cause great bodily harm
as an element as do other crimes of murder. See M. Cwaan' BAssIoun, SuasTMArIVE CRU41NAL
LAW 247 (1978). When a person commits a violent felony, the intent to commit the felony
supplies the intent for any resulting murder. Id. The law operates to impute malice or intent
to the felon. Id. The intent from one felon is imputed to all of his co-defendants. Cabana v.
Bullock, 106 S. Ct. 689, 695 (1986).
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doctrine is to impute intent from one defendant to his co-defendant, it
presents the possibility that a defendant will be sentenced to death on the
basis of his co-defendant's intent. 69 In Locketf 0 the Court dealt with a felony
murder defendant whose level of participation in the robbery was limited to
planning the robbery and waiting in the getaway car. 71 The Court decided
Lockett without considering the issue of imputed culpability. 72 Rather, the
Supreme Court concluded that the Ohio statute, which limited the consid-
eration of mitigating factors to three, did not provide the required eighth
amendment safeguard of an individualized sentencing procedure.73 Several
Justices, however, did discuss a finding of culpability as a prerequisite for
a death sentence. 74 For example, although Justice White dissented, consistent
with his belief that mandatory death sentences do not violate the eighth
amendment, he concurred in the judgment to invalidate the statute and
argued that the imposition of the death penalty where there is no finding
that "the defendant possessed a purpose to cause the death of a victim"
violates the eighth amendment. 75 The Court later explained 76 that the Lockett
decision "envisioned" that the sentencer, who heard the testimony and saw
the witnesses, would consider the mitigating factors. 77 Furthermore, the Court
decided that the sentencer is "responsible for weighing the specific aggra-
vating and mitigating circumstances" necessary to make a life-or-death
decision.7 1
69. Bullock, 106 S. Ct. at 696 ("[Tlhe jury may well have sentenced Bullock to death
despite concluding that he had neither killed nor intended to kill .... .
70. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
71. Id.
72. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
73. 438 U.S. at 608.
74. Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion stated:
The absence of direct proof that the defendant intended to cause the death of the
victim is relevant for mitigating purposes only if it is determined that it sheds some
light on one of [Ohio's] . . . three statutory mitigating factors. Similarly, consid-
eration of a defendant's comparatively minor role in the offense, or age, would
generally not be permitted, as such to affect the sentencing decision.
The limited range of mitigating circumstances which may be considered by the
sentencer under the Ohio statute is incompatible with the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. To meet constitutional requirements, a death penalty statute must
not preclude consideration of relevant mitigating factors.
438 U.S. at 608.
Chief Justice Burger considered the felony murder defendant's intent to be a mitigating factor
in the same way a defendant's age is a mitigating factor. Therefore, flexible, broad mitigating
factors must be included in the death penalty statute to meet constitutional standards.
75. 438 U.S. at 623-24.
76. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 327 (1985).
77. Id.
78. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 462 (1984). In Spaziano, the Court held that a state
may give the sentencing decision to the trial judge rather than to the jury. The Court acknowl-
edged that the majority of the states (thirty out of the thirty-seven states that allowed the death
penalty) give the life-death decision to the jury, but found that the trial judge could be given
that decision as well. Id.
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The Supreme Court first considered the sentencing problem created by
inferred intent in Enmund v. Florida.79 Justice White's majority opinion held
that the eighth amendment does not permit the "imposition" of the death
penalty on a defendant who aids and abets in a felony which results in a
murder, unless the defendant himself kills, attempts to kill, intends that a
killing take place, or intends that lethal force be used. 0 The majority
concluded that, although death is an appropriate punishment for some felony
murderers, intent merely imputed from a co-defendant is not a sufficient
basis for imposing the death penalty.8' The Court refused to uphold En-
mund's death sentence because there was no proof that he killed, attempted
to kill, intended that a life be taken, or intended that lethal force be used.82
In Enmund, as in Coker,3 the Court's holding was based on a propor-
tionality argument. The Court reasoned that without some "intent" to
deprive the victim of life, the sentence of death was disproportionate to the
defendant's intent to commit the related felony.8 4 Referring to its decision
in Lockett, 5 the Court concluded that the individualized sentence, required
by the eighth amendment, was missing where there was no finding on the
defendant's culpability. 6
Enmund did not explicitly state who was to make this determination or
at what point in the process it was to be made. 7 As a result, different
79. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
80. Id. at 797. The majority concluded that, while inferred intent is sufficient to find a
defendant guilty of murder, it is not sufficient for a sentence of death. Id. at 798. The Court
stated that the focus must be on the defendant's culpability, not on that of his co-defendant.
Id. at 798, 801. The majority found that most legislatures refuse to impose a death sentence
where there is no personal responsibility and noted that it has no reason to disagree with the
states' judgment. Id. at 801. Pointing to robbery statistics, the Court noted that only one half
of one percent of all robberies end in homicide and that the death penalty is seldom imposed
on "one only vicariously guilty of the murder." Id. at 800.
The Court decided that Enmund did not kill or intend to kill and that, because his culpability
was different from the robbers who killed, the state could not treat him in the same manner.
Id. at 798. The Court further found that the eighth amendment prohibits attributing to Enmund
the intent of his co-defendants. Id. at 801.
81. 458 U.S. at 798.
82. Id. at 797. On remand the Florida Supreme Court vacated Enmund's death sentence in
accordance with the United States Supreme Court decision. Enmund v. State, 439 So. 2d 1383
(Fla. 1983). The Florida Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court with directions to
impose two life sentences without eligibility of parole for twenty-five years. Id. The only
discretion given the trial court was whether the sentences should run consecutively or concur-
rently. Id. See infra notes 194-99 and accompanying text.
83. 433 U.S. 584 (1977). See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
84. 458 U.S. at 797. The Court concluded that death is an excessive penalty for a robber
who does not take a human life. Id. The Supreme Court found that the record in Enmund did
not warrant a finding that he had any intention of "participating in or facilitating a murder."
Id. at 798.
85. 438 U.S. 586 (1978). See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
86. 458 U.S. at 798.
87. The wording of the Enmund opinion leads to the conclusion that the sentencer is to
19881
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
interpretations of the decision by lower courts led to different conclusions.
The Eleventh Circuit held, in Ross v. Kemp,8" that Enmund did not require
that the jury make the culpability findings.8 9 The Ross court examined the
record and found that the defendant had the requisite intent to be sentenced
to death. 90 It determined that the eighth amendment requires no more than
a federal habeas corpus court's independent review of the record to insure
that the defendant's participation in the crime warrants the punishment of
death. 91
Other courts construed Enmund as requiring that the trier of fact determine
a defendant's level of culpability. 92 The Court settled this debate in favor of
the Eleventh Circuit in Cabana v. Bullock.93 The Court held that any court
capable of reviewing a criminal sentence may determine whether the defen-
dant had the level of intent required by Enmund.94
II. THE BULLOCK CASE
In the early morning hours of September 22, 1978, Crawford Bullock and
his friend, Ricky Tucker, accepted a ride home from a bar with Mark
Dickson. 9 During the trip, Dickson and Tucker argued about some money
that Dickson allegedly owed to Tucker.96 The argument escalated into a fight
and Dickson stopped the car and began exchanging blows with Tucker. 97
Bullock attempted to grab Dickson, but Dickson quickly fled from the car
determine whether or not the defendant possessed the required culpability to warrant a punish-
ment of death. For example, the opinion states, "For purposes of imposing the death penalty,
* . . culpability must be limited to his participation . . . and his punishment must be tailored
to his personal responsibility and moral guilt." 458 U.S. at 801. The opinion further states that
"it is for us [the Supreme Court] ultimately to judge whether the Eighth Amendment permits
imposition of the death penalty on one such as Enmund .... " Id. at 797 (emphasis added).
This conclusion is supported by the Court's earlier decisions in Lockett and Caldwell. In
Enmund the Court quoted from Lockett to explain that the "focus must be on his culpability,
... for we insist on 'individualized consideration as a constitutional requirement in imposing
the death sentence.' " Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798 (quoting Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605). The
opinion in Caldwell, stated that the individualized consideration required by Lockett should be
made by the sentencers "who were present to hear the evidence and arguments and see the
witnesses." 472 U.S. at 327.
88. 756 F.2d 1483 (1985).
89. Id. at 1486.
90. Id. at 1489.
91. Id. The Bullock Court agreed with this interpretation but stated that state courts should
consider the culpability que~tion first. Bullock, 106 S. Ct. at 695 n.l.
92. Bullock v. Lucas, 743 F.2d 244 (5th Cir. 1984); Hyman v. Aiken, 777 F.2d 938 (4th
Cir. 1985) (vacated in light of Bullock).
93. 106 S. Ct. 689 ( 1986).'
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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with Tucker giving chase. 98 Bullock, wearing a leg cast, followed more
slowly. 99
When Bullock caught up, the men were struggling and Bullock held
Dickson's head as Tucker struck Dickson's face with a whiskey bottle. I°°
Tucker then beat Dickson with his fists until Dickson fell helplessly to the
ground.101 Tucker then killed Dickson by repeatedly smashing his head with
a concrete block. 102 Bullock and Tucker disposed of the body and Bullock
kept Dickson's car.103 The next day, Bullock was arrested when the police
spotted him in the car."°4 He confessed during interrogation at the police
station. 0
After a bifurcated trial,1°6 Bullock was convicted of murder under a
Mississippi statute which defined felony murder as a capital offense.107 After
the guilt phase, the court instructed the jury on the doctrine of accomplice
liability. This instruction permitted the jury to find Bullock guilty of capital
murder if it found that he participated in the robbery of Dickson and did
any affirmative act in connection with the robbery regardless of whether or
not he had any desire to cause the death of Dickson. 0 The jury found
Bullock guilty of capital murder. 1' 9 In sentencing him, the jury found two
aggravating circumstances, no mitigating circumstances, and sentenced Bul-
lock to death." 0
Bullock presented the Mississippi Supreme Court with two major argu-
ments."' First, the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to convict
him of capital murder and, therefore, the jury should not have been allowed
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. In a bifurcated trial the jury first determines whether the defendant is guilty. Then a
sentencing hearing is conducted after which the same jury, a different jury, or the trial judge
determines what sentence the defendant should receive. The purpose of the sentencing hearing
is to determine "the appropriate choice of applicable punishment. Since this type of hearing
does not bear on the issue of guilt and innocence which has already been determined, the rules
of evidence are relaxed and all evidence bearing on the mitigation and aggravation of the crime
and the offender is admissible." M. CI-RIF BAssiouNi, SUBSTANTIVE CRIHNA. LAW 130 (1978).
107. 106 S. Ct. at 693-94. The Mississippi statute provided that a capital murder is the killing
of a human being without authority of law by any means or in any manner. It also defined
capital murder as a killing which occurred during the commission of a violent felony with or
without any intent to cause death. Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-19(2)(e) (Supp. 1985).
108. 106 S. Ct. at 694.
109. Id.
110. Id. Bullock's co-defendant Tucker was tried in a separate proceeding. He was found
guilty and sentenced to life in prison. Bullock v. Lucas, 743 F.2d 244, 246 (5th Cir. 1984).
111. Id. Bullock v. State, 391 So. 2d 601 (Miss. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 931 (1981)
(defendant alleged twenty-eight errors in trial court proceedings).
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to consider the death penalty."2 Second, the imposition of the death penalty
would be disproportionate to his level of involvement in the crime and,
therefore, a violation of the eighth amendment." 3 Both of these arguments
were rejected. The Mississippi Supreme Court found the evidence that Bul-
lock aided and assisted Tucker in the robbery, assault, and slaying of Dickson
"overwhelming" and, therefore, concluded that the punishment was not
disproportionate to his guilt." 4
Bullock exhausted his state postconviction remedies and was denied federal
habeas corpus relief at the district court level."' The Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court and held that Bullock's death
sentence was invalid under the Supreme Court's intervening decision in
Enmund." 6 The Fifth Circuit rested its decision upon the jury instructions
given at both the guilt and sentencing phases of Bullock's trial. It reasoned
that the jury could have convicted and sentenced Bullock without a finding
of intent." 7 The court interpreted Enmund as prohibiting the execution of
Bullock unless such findings were made by the trier of fact." ' It granted the
writ, vacated his sentence, and instructed the state to either give Bullock a
life sentence or to conduct a new sentencing hearing." 9 It then instructed
that, if the proper findings were made during the sentencing hearing, the
state court could reimpose the death sentence. 20
The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of a conflict between the
Fifth Circuit's opinion in Bullock and the Eleventh Circuit's holding in Ross
v. Kemp. 2 ' The Bullock majority concluded that the Enmund findings are
part of the sentencing process and not the guilt process and, therefore, are
not required to be made by the trier of fact. 122 The Court acknowledged
that the jury was never instructed to find any intent on the part of Bullock. 23
However, it concluded that Enmund did not impose any specific procedures
112. 391 So. 2d at 604, 606.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 614.
115. Cabana v. Bullock, 106 S. Ct. 689, 694 (1986).
116. Bullock v. Lucas, 743 F.2d 244 (5th Cir. 1984).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Ross v. Kemp, 756 F.2d 1483 (1985). The eighth amendment does not require that the
state prove the Enmund findings to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt at the guilt or sentencing
phase before death lawfully can be imposed. Id. at 1488. All that is required is that a reviewing
court determine from the record whether or not the eighth amendment has been satisfied. Id.
122. 106 S. Ct. at 696-97 (the ruling in Enmund does not concern guilt or innocence; "it
establishes no new elements of the crime of murder that must be found by the jury"). See also
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984) (whether the death penalty is appropriate is not a
decision which a jury is required to make).
123. 106 S. Ct. at 696 ("the jury may well have sentenced Bullock to death despite concluding
that he had neither killed nor intended to kill; or it may have reached its decision without ever
coming to any conclusion whatever on those questions.").
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upon the states and that the eighth amendment is satisfied so long as "any
court that has the power to find the facts and vacate the sentence" determines
the "requisite culpability."1 24
The majority found that the Fifth Circuit erred in limiting its review to
the jury instructions and findings.'25 Instead, the Court explained, a federal
habeas corpus court should consider the record as a whole and determine
whether or not the culpability finding was made at any point in the process. 26
The Bullock Court noted that, if the findings have been made, the federal
habeas corpus court must presume them to be correct. 27 Unless the petitioner
can overcome this presumption, the habeas corpus court must hold that the
eighth amendment is not violated. 28 The Court determined that a federal
habeas corpus court could itself make the Enmund findings, however, it
stated that it is sounder policy to leave the factual findings to the state's
judicial system. 29 Applying this analysis to Bullock, the Court held that the
district court should issue the writ of habeas corpus vacating Bullock's death
sentence but leave Mississippi free to determine in its own courts whether
or not Bullock possessed the requisite culpability. If the Mississippi courts
determined that Bullock was culpable, then it could reimpose the death
sentence. 30
The dissent, written by Justice Blackmun and joined by Justices Brennan
and Marshall, argued that the Enmund findings should be made at the trial
court level prior to sentencing. 3' They cited Caldwell v. Mississippi,3 2 to
point out that there are limits on an appellate court's ability to determine
whether a defendant should be sentenced to death.' The dissent interpreted
Enmund as "establishing a constitutionally required factual predicate for the
valid imposition of the death penalty."' 3 4 The dissent argued that the cul-
pability determination should be made prior to any sentence of death.'" It
124. Id. at 697. The majority opinion gives special deference to the states. It quoted Spaziano,
468 U.S. at 464, stating that the Supreme Court is "unwilling to say that there is any one right
way for a State to set up its capital sentencing scheme." Id. However, Justice Blackmun
dissented and stressed that to say there is no "one right way to set up its capital-sentencing
scheme ...does not mean that there are no wrong ways." Id. at 705.
125. 106 S. Ct. at 696.
126. Id. at 697-98.
127. Id. Trial court findings are presumed correct under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1982). Id. See
also Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 545-47 (1981) (presumption of correctness applies to facts
found by appellate courts as well as trial courts).
128. 106 S. Ct. at 698.
129. Id. at 699.
130. Id. at 700.
131. Id. at 701.
132. 472 U.S. 320, 327 (1985) (Court "envisioned" that a defendant has a constitutional
right to have sentencer, who was present to hear and see the witnesses, consider mitigating
circumstances).
133. 106 S. Ct. at 701.
134. Id. at 702.
135. Id. at 701.
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found that the majority position collapsed the fact finding and review
processes into one proceeding and abandoned a critical protection provided
by capital sentencing systems. 1 6
III. ANALYSIS
The Bullock opinion '1 7 held that any court with power to hear facts and
vacate a sentence can cure an eighth amendment violation caused by sen-
136. Id. at 706.
137. Justice White's earlier opinions laid the foundation for the decision in Bullock. He filed
a concurring opinion in the Furman per curiam decision and stated that the constitutionality
of the death penalty was not at issue. 408 U.S. at 312. Rather, he believed the issue was the
manner in which death as a punishment was imposed. In Furman, Justice White concluded
that the death sentence could be imposed so infrequently that it would "cease to be a credible
deterrent or measurably to contribute to any other end of punishment in the criminal justice
system." Id.
In Gregg, Justice White concurred and upheld death as a punishment asserting that the death
penalty is not cruel and unusual in all circumstances. 428 U.S. at 226. He noted that Georgia's
statute required jury consideration of aggravating circumstances and also required the Georgia
Supreme Court to review the decision to insure that the sentence was not imposed in a
discriminatory, standardless, or rare fashion. Thus, he found the statute valid under Furman.
Id. at 221-23.
In each of the four Gregg companion cases, Justice White wrote separately to explain why
each capital statute should survive a Furman analysis and, therefore, be upheld. He concluded
that mandatory death sentences are not unconstitutional per se. According to his procedural
analysis, so long as a state takes steps to prevent the infrequent and arbitrary imposition of
the death penalty, it meets eighth amendment standards. In Roberts and Woodson, he dissented
and would have upheld the death penalty statutes because he believes that it is not the role of
the judiciary to strike down state statutes which conform with the constitution. He further
believes that mandatory death sentences for certain crimes are not unconstitutional. See Roberts
v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. at 261-62 (White, J., dissenting) and Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. at 306-07 (White, J., dissenting). In Proffitt and Jurek, Justice White concurred in
upholding the capital statutes because they provided for consideration of aggravating and
mitigating factors which serve to insure that death is not imposed "freakishly or rarely but will
be imposed with regularity." Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. at 260-61 (White, J., concurring);
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. at 279 (White, J., concurring). In addition, he observed that since
the Texas statute had been enacted, thirty-three persons were sentenced to die which showed
that the penalty would not be "imposed so seldom and arbitrarily as to serve no useful
penalogical function. ... Jurek, 428 U.S. at 279 (White, J., concurring).
However, in Coker v. Georgia, Justice White wrote the majority opinion and held that death
as a punishment for the crime of rape of an adult woman is cruel and unusual because it is
grossly disproportionate to the crime. 433 U.S. at 592. Justice White noted that in Georgia,
even the crime of deliberate murder was not punished by death unless there was proof of
aggravating circumstances. He reasoned that a rapist should not be punished more severely
than a deliberate murderer as long as the victim is not killed. Id. at 600.
In Lockett v. Ohio, Justice White dissented from the majority position that capital cases
require individualized sentences. 438 U.S. at 621-22. However, he concurred in the decision to
reverse the death penalty for a reason not addressed by the plurality. Justice White stated that
the eighth amendment required a finding that the defendant intended to cause the death of the
victim. Id. at 624. He explained, "It is clear from recent history that the infliction of death
under circumstances where there is no purpose to take life has been widely rejected as grossly
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tencing a defendant to death without a finding of culpability. 3 s In essence,
the Court stated that a state may violate the eighth amendment by sentencing
a convicted person to death so long as the violation is remedied before the
person is actually put to death.3 9 The majority reached this unsettling result
by viewing the culpability determination as a "categorical rule" which is a
"substantive limitation" on sentencing procedures. 4 Justice White, writing
for the majority, explained that this limitation, like other sentencing limits,
does not need to be enforced by a jury but can be enforced by any court
capable of reviewing a criminal sentence.' 4'
The Court acknowledged that the jury may have sentenced Bullock to
death despite finding that he never killed nor intended a killing take place.1
42
In fact, Bullock's sentencing could have taken place without the jury ever
considering his personal culpability. 43 However, the Supreme Court held
that a review of the jury instructions is just the first step in the Enmund
inquiry. '"The majority's holding concluded that a felony murder defendant's
level of personal intent need not be considered as a statutory aggravating or
mitigating circumstance."15 The Court instead regarded the level of culpability
out of proportion to the seriousness of the crime." Id. at 625.
Justice White's reasoning in Lockett made him the logical choice to author the majority
opinion in Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). Enmund was convicted of felony murder
and sentenced to death under a Florida statute which did not require a finding of culpability.
In striking down the death sentence, Justice White continued the line of reasoning he began in
Lockett. He explained that "[flor purposes of imposing the death penalty, Enmund's criminal
culpability must be limited to his participation in the robbery, and his punishment must be
tailored to his personal responsibility and moral guilt." Id. at 801.
When Cabana v. Bullock raised the issue of who was to make the culpability determination,
Justice White again was chosen to write for the majority. 106 S. Ct. 689 (1986). In Bullock he
held that the trier of fact need not find the Enmund intent. Rather, he decided an appellate
or collateral court is capable of determining whether or not the record supports a finding of
intent. Id.
138. 106 S. Ct. at 697. "The Eighth Amendment violation can be adequately remedied by
any court that has the power to find the facts and vacate the sentence." Id.
139. Id. "[A]t what precise point in its criminal process a State chooses to make the Enmund
determination is of little concern from the standpoint of the Constitution." Id. See also Justice
Blackmun's dissent which describes the majority position as allowing the states to tell a defendant
he may die without first considering his personal culpability. Id. at 703.
140. 106 S. Ct. at 697.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 696. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
143. 106 S. Ct. at 696. The jury instructions were confusing and would have allowed the
jury to convict Bullock of capital murder on the basis of his participation in a robbery during
which another person killed the victim. Id. at 695. In addition, the jury was not instructed that
a finding of culpability was a prerequisite to sentencing Bullock to death. Id. This is why the
Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the state court. Bullock v. Lucas, 743 F.2d 244 (5th Cir.
1984). The Court told the state to conduct another sentencing hearing or to sentence Bullock
to life in prison. Id.
144. 106 S. Ct. at 696.
145. Id. at 697. However, a defendant's intent, when not an element of the substantive
crime, should be part of the sentencing consideration of aggravating factors. In Lockett, the
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to be a limitation on the sentencing process which can be made on direct
appeal or collateral review.'"
The Bullock Court held that a federal habeas corpus court must review
the record as a whole to determine whether at any point in the proceeding
the Enmund findings were made.' 47 If the findings were made, the federal
habeas corpus court must presume that they are correct.'48 The eighth
amendment is not violated unless the petitioner can overcome the heavy
burden of this presumption. 49
The Bullock Court based its analysis on three premises: Enmund did not
impose a form of procedure on the states; Enmund did not add to a state's
definition of any substantive offense; and Enmund is merely a substantive
limitation on the sentencing procedure and, therefore, amenable to the usual
proportionality review.' 50
In claiming that Enmund does not impose a procedure on the states, the
Court recognized that a state is free to set up its criminal justice system with
minimal interference from the federal government or courts.'5' However, the
Court's assumption that a new procedure would be necessary, overlooks the
fact that these procedures are already in place. The Court's past decisions
have held that the eighth and fourteenth amendments require individualized
sentencing procedures in capital cases.' 52 Individualized sentencing requires
Court stated that although states may "make aiders and abetters equally responsible, as a
matter of law, with principals ..... the definition of crimes generally has not been thought
automatically to dictate what should be the proper penalty." 438 U.S. at 602. The Court further
said that where there is sentencing discretion, the sentencer should have all the information
"concerning the defendant's life and characteristics" because it is "highly relevant-if not
essential" to the imposition of a punishment. 438 U.S. at 602-03 (citations omitted). The
Lockett Court cited Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 585 (1959), to emphasize that a
sentencer is "authorized, if not required, to consider all of the mitigating and aggravating
circumstances involved in the crime."
146. 106 S. Ct. at 697.
147. Id.
148. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1982). See also Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981) (appellate
court findings presumed correct).
149. 106 S. Ct. at 698.
150. Id. at 705 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent finds that none of these propositions
justify the holding. Id.
151. See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 602-03. "That States have authority to make aiders and abettors
equally responsible, as a matter of law, with principals, or to enact felony-murder statutes is
beyond constitutional challenge." Id.
152. See, e.g., Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604-05. The Lockett Court held that though individualized
sentencing is not constitutionally required in noncapital cases, it has long been accepted in this
country; because executed capital sentences cannot be corrected, individualized sentencing is
essential; the eighth and fourteenth amendments require that all mitigating factors offered by
the capital defendant be considered. Id.
The Supreme Court has imposed procedural guidelines on the states' capital statutes. The
Court has held that state sentencing procedures must allow the sentencer to consider aggravating
and mitigating circumstances. See supra note 145. In Woodson the Court held that the North
Carolina's mandatory death sentencing procedure was inadequate because it did not provide an
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the jury to consider aggravating and mitigating factors before passing sen-
tence. ' Enmund findings should be one of the aggravating circumstances
written into the states' statutes. The Bullock holding, however, concludes
that Enmund findings are not part of this individualized sentencing proce-
dure. This treats felony murderers differently from deliberate murderers and
creates an arbitrary distinction between classes of defendants which should
not be allowed. 5 4
Intent is an element of the crime of deliberate murder.'55 Therefore, a
person convicted of deliberate murder will never be sentenced to death
without a finding of personal responsibility. Intent is not an element of the
crime of felony murder'56 and there is no reason to make it an element.
However, unless the Enmund finding is considered by the sentencer, the
felony murderer is subject to a death sentence without any finding of personal
responsibility for the killing. Then the findings supporting the imposed death
sentence will be presumed correct by the appellate court and the felony
murderer will have a heavy burden in overcoming this presumption. 51 7 The
result is that the appellate court will make culpability findings on a paper
record without ever having seen the witnesses or heard the testimony.'"
Moreover, the appellate court's determination will be presumed correct by
the collateral court. 59 If Enmund findings were not made at the state trial
court or appellate court levels, the federal habeas corpus court is invited to
make the findings. This sequence of events treats felony murderers differently
from deliberate murderers. It allows an eighth amendment violation to be
made in the sentencing of a felony murderer that would not be tolerated in
the sentencing of a deliberate murderer.
Woodson, Roberts, and Lockett held that mandatory death penalties are
unconstitutional in their application and that the sentencer must be allowed
to consider mitigating as well as aggravating factors. 60 A finding that Bullock
did not intend that a killing take place is certainly a factor which, if found,
would mitigate against the imposition of the death penalty. More impor-
adequate means of identifying those defendants capable of being put to death. 428 U.S. at 290.
In Roberts the Court found that Louisiana's mandatory capital statute did not comport with
Furman's directive that "standardless jury discretion be replaced by procedures that safeguard
against the arbitrary and capricious imposition of death sentences." 428 U.S. at 334.
153. See supra note 152.
154. The crime of deliberate murder has intent as one of its elements. Therefore, a person
convicted of deliberate murder will be sentenced to death only after a finding has been made
that he had some level of intent in the commission of the crime. The crime of felony murder
does not have personal intent as an element of the crime. See supra notes 68-82 and accom-
panying text. Unless the Enmund findings are made a statutorily aggravating circumstance, the
felony murderer will be sentenced to death without any finding of personal culpability.
155. See supra notes 68-82 and accompanying text.
156. Id.
157. See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
158. See infra notes 175-82 and accompanying text.
159. See Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981).
160. See supra notes 42-53 and accompanying text.
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tantly, a finding that Bullock did intend that a killing take place or that
lethal force be used would be an appropriate circumstance in aggravation
which would place him into the category of person who could be executed.
When a deliberate murderer is sentenced to death, the sentencer must
consider all relevant aggravating and mitigating factors. A defendant con-
victed of felony murder should be afforded the same sentencing protection
before being told that he must die. If a felony murderer cannot be executed
without a determination of personal responsibility1 61 and statutory aggravat-
ing circumstances are a way of determining who can be sentenced to die, 62
it follows that Enmund findings are an aggravating circumstance which
narrows the class of offenders who can be executed. 163 As the Court explained
in Zant v. Stephens, "[w]hat is important at the selection stage is an
individualized determination on the basis of the character of the individual
and the circumstances of the crime." '6 Indeed, the sentencer should exercise
additional care in sentencing a person to die when he is found guilty on an
accomplice liability theory. 165 The Supreme Court has concluded that inferred
intent, while sufficient for the substantive crime of felony murder, is not
sufficient for the imposition of the death sentence.'6
The Court's second premise, that Enmund does not add any new element
to the substantive offense, is not disputed. 67 However, the majority assumes
that requiring the sentencer to make a culpability determination will effect
the guilt phase of the trial. This is not true. The required intent finding is
simply one of aggravation and has nothing to do with the jury's verdict on
guilt. The substantive offense of felony murder will continue to be based on
inferred intent regardless of whether the defendant's lack of culpability
161. Enmund, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
162. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983). To avoid arbitrary and capricious sentencing
"an aggravating circumstance must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death
penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant
compared to others found guilty of murder." Id. at 877 (footnotes omitted).
163. Id. at 878. The Zant Court concluded that past cases found statutory aggravating
circumstances "play a constitutionally necessary function at the stage of legislative definition:
they circumscribe the class of persons eligible for the death penalty." Id.
164. Id. (emphasis in original).
165. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
166. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801. The Court explained that a defendant's intent is critical to
his degree of culpability and criminal penalties are unconstitutionally excessive in the absence
of wrongdoing. Id. at 800. The Court further stated that the defendant's culpability should be
limited to his participation in the crime and the punishment should be "tailored to his personal
responsibility and moral guilt." Id. at 801.
167. Bullock, 106 S. Ct. at 696. Enmund does not establish any new element of the crime.
Id. In his dissent, Justice Blackmun agrees that no new elements are created but he claims that
the majority does not recognize the distinction between defining the offense and executing the
defendant. Id. at 706. He further explained that the jury need not be instructed on intent to
find the felony murder defendant guilty, but that Enmund will bar the death penalty if the
instruction was not given to the sentencer. Id. (citing Skillern v. Estelle, 720 F.2d 839 (1983),
reh'g denied, 724 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1984)).
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prevents him from being sentenced to death once he is found guilty.
By focusing on this red herring, the majority ignored the distinction that
this decision makes between persons convicted of felony murder and persons
convicted of deliberate murder. The Bullock Court noted the differences
between the guilt and sentencing phases of a criminal trial and explained
that while a defendant has a constitutional right to a jury determination in
the guilt phase, he does not have a corresponding right during the sentencing
phase. 16 The Court recognized that a jury verdict cannot stand unless the
jury was instructed to find each element of the crime under the proper
standard of proof. 69 Furthermore, the majority acknowledged that failure
to instruct the jury on each element of the crime cannot be cured by findings
made by a judge at trial or on appeal. 70
The Court concluded, however, that any error made concerning the En-
mund findings can be cured by the trial judge, the state appellate court, or
the federal habeas corpus court.' 7 The Court ignored its position in Woodson
that the eighth amendment's respect for humanity requires that the character
and record of the offender and the "circumstances of the particular offense"
be considered, even though individualized sentencing is not a constitutional
requirement. 72 The culpability determination required by Enmund should be
an aggravating circumstance of the offense considered by the sentencer before
death is imposed.' 73 Supreme Court decisions have never allowed an appellate
or habeas corpus court to make findings of aggravating and mitigating
factors; this obligation belongs to the sentencer. 74
The Court's third premise, that Enmund is merely a substantive limitation
on the sentencing procedure and, therefore, amenable to the usual propor-
tionality review, 75 is never clearly stated in Enmund. 176 The Enmund decision
168. 106 S. Ct. at 696-97. The jury has never been required to decide whether or not a
punishment is appropriate. Id. at 697 (citing Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 462 (1984)).
The Bullock Court explained that, whether or not a sentence is disproportionate and violates
the eighth amendment, like other questions concerning a criminal defendant's constitutional
rights, is an appropriate decision for a trial judge or an appellate court. 106 S. Ct. at 696-97.
169. Bullock, 106 S. Ct. at 696.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 697-98. The Enmund findings are part of the sentencing phase. Id.
172. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304.
173. See supra notes 42-94, 160-66 and accompanying text.
174. See, e.g., Lockett, 438 U.S. at 608 (limited range of mitigating circumstances considered
by the sentencer is incompatible with eighth and fourteenth amendments); Woodson, 428 U.S.
at 304 (North Carolina's capital statute was unconstitutional because it did not allow individ-
ualized consideration before imposition of death penalty); Roberts, 428 U.S. at 335 (Louisiana's
statute provided no standards to guide the sentencer "in the exercise of its power to select
those first-degree murderers who will receive the death sentence"); Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 258 (
Furman is satisfied when "the sentencing authority's discretion is guided and channeled by
requiring examination" of aggravating and mitigating circumstances); Jurek, 428 U.S. at 271
(jury should be allowed to consider aggravating and mitigating factors).
175. Bullock, 106 S. Ct. at 697.
176. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
held that a sentence of death is disproportionate to the crime of felony
murder when the defendant is found guilty on the theory of accomplice
liability but not found to have had the requisite intent.1 77 However, Enmund
does not clearly state that the requisite culpability may be found after
sentencing by an appellate or collateral court which neither saw the witnesses
nor heard the testimony. 7 Rather, it holds that a defendant must have had
the required intent "to be sentenced to death.' ' 79 Although the normal
meaning of these words would indicate that intent must be considered before
sentencing, the Bullock decision interprets them to mean that intent must be
considered before the person is actually executed.'10 The Bullock Court did
not acknowledge that Enmund paid particular attention to the number of
juries which have rejected the death penalty in cases factually similar to
Bullock,'81 and that Enmund used these sentencing statistics to show that
society does not accept the punishment of death for accomplice liability in
felony murder.1
2
An appellate court may decide, based upon the evidence adduced at trial,
that the sentence of death for a particular defendant is unwarranted.'
However, the Bullock decision is the first time an appellate court has been
given carte blanche to make a de novo finding of fact.8 4 Bullock does not
merely restate the role of the appellate court in conducting a sufficiency
review of the evidence.8 5 Instead it permits appellate and collateral courts
to make findings of fact in the first instance.
Although Enmund can be read to support Bullock, 8 6 Enmund read in
light of Lockett and Caldwell will not support the Bullock holding. The
177. Id.
178. The Bullock majority briefly mentions in a footnote that there may be times when
appellate fact finding will not be adequate because the Enmund finding may turn on credibility
determinations which an appellate court is not equipped to make. 106 S. Ct. at 698 n.5. The
dissent recognizes that Bullock itself turns on credibility and is, therefore, not an appropriate
case for appellate fact finding. Id. at 707.
179. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 788, 801. "Imposition of the death penalty in these circumstances
is inconsistent with the eighth and fourteenth amendments." Id. at 788. "For purposes of
imposing the death penalty" these findings must be made. Id. at 801.
180. Bullock, 106 S. Ct. at 697 ("the eighth amendment violation can be adequately remedied
by any court that has the power to find the facts and vacate the sentence").
181. 458 U.S. at 794-96. See Kalven & Zeisel, The American Jury and the Death Penalty,
33 U. Cm. L. REV. 769, 779 (1966) (juries do not impose death penalty for vicarious liability).
182. 458 U.S. at 794. "The evidence is overwhelming that American juries have repudiated
imposition of the death penalty for crimes such as [Enmund's]." Id.
183. See, e.g., Enmund, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (death penalty wrongly imposed on felony
murder defendant in absence of finding personal culpability); Coker, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (death
penalty for rape of adult woman is unconstitutional).
184. 106 S. Ct. at 703 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent claims the majority ignores
the proper roles of the trial and appellate courts. Id.
185. See LARRY W. YACKLE, POSTCONVICTION REmEDris 490 (1981) ("Judicial review of
factual findings always involves some degree of speculation .... Courts tend to avoid the
problem by finding fair support in the state court record.").
186. See infra notes 194-99 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 37:289
CABANA V. BULLOCK
Enmund majority relied on Lockett' to hold that the constitutional require-
ment of individualized consideration in "imposing" the death penalty must
be honored.' Since the Supreme Court's decision in Caldwell "envisioned"
that Lockett's individualized consideration would be made by the sentencer, s9
it follows that the sentencer should also make the Enmund findings. Both
Lockett and Enmund were felony murderers facing a death sentence. In each
case the Supreme Court majority found that there was no finding that the
defendant was one of the class of offenders that deserved to be executed.
Further, in Caldwell the Court held that the prosecutor could not minimize
the role of the jury and allow the jury to think that it did not have the last
word on the fate of the capital defendant. 19° In fact, the Caldwell Court
determined that an appellate court is not to evaluate the appropriateness of
the death penalty in the first instance.' 9' Most importantly, the Caldwell
Court stated that the fact that there will be an appellate review is irrelevant
to the sentencing procedure and is not a valid basis for allowing a jury to
return a sentence that it might not otherwise return. 92 In addition, the
Enmund decision contains many references to the culpability determination
being made before sentence is passed.193
The result in Enmund allowed the sentencing disparity now caused by
Bullock. In Enmund the Supreme Court made its own determination that
the petitioner did not have the requisite culpability for the imposition of a
death sentence. The Supreme Court of Florida had specifically rejected the
trial court's finding that Enmund had personally committed the murders,
but found that his level of participation was sufficient for the imposition of
the death penalty. 94 The trial court had rejected Enmund's claim that his
participation was limited because it believed that Enmund actually killed the
victims. 195 As the Enmund dissent pointed out, this "fundamental misun-
derstanding" of his participation in the crime prevented the trial court from
considering the individual circumstances of his particular offense when it
imposed the sentence.19' The dissent would have remanded the case for a
187. 438 U.S. at 605.
188. 458 U.S. at 798. Florida treated Enmund the same as the robber who killed, by attributing
the killer's intent to Enmund. This was found impermissible under the eighth amendment. Id.
189. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
190. 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
191. Id. at 327. The Court pointed out that even inexperienced attorneys know that an
appellate court is not to impose a death sentence in the first instance, but only to review the
jury's decision with a presumption of correctness. Id. at 328.
192. Id. at 330.
193. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
194. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 788. The Florida Supreme Court concluded that the record showed
no more than an inference that Enmund was the getaway driver but that this was sufficient
under Florida law to make him an aider and abetter and, therefore, a principal in first degree
murder who could be sentenced to death. Id.
195. Id. at 785 n.2.
196. Id. at 830.
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new sentencing hearing. 97 In its argument, the Enmund dissenters quoted
Lockett and Woodson to emphasize that the eighth amendment requires that
the "sentencer" consider the character and record of the individual and the
particular offense as part of the process of inflicting the death penalty. 98
Unfortunately, the Enmund majority made the intent findings itself and
remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. 99
The Bullock Court did not fully consider the issue of credibility and the
fact that many times fact finders rely on the demeanor of the witnesses in
reaching their decisions. The credibility issue is not even addressed in the
main opinion. Instead it is relegated to a footnote which indicates that there
"might" be some situations where an Enmund determination will turn on
credibility and, therefore, is unsuitable for appellate review. 200 As the dissent
emphasized, the majority ignored the fact that the Bullock case itself revolved
around the credibility of the defendant. 20 1 Justice Blackmun noted that
Bullock took the stand during the guilt and sentencing phases of his trial
and denied any intent to see the victim killed. 202 As Justice Blackmun
explained, the trial judge or jury who saw Bullock testify may have believed
that he lied. But it is difficult to see how an appellate court, "without any
indication from anyone who actually saw him testify," could conclude with
confidence that he lied. 203 The fact that one feels little compassion for a
criminal who takes an innocent life, does not justify discarding the principles
which are the foundation of the criminal justice system.
Finally, the Court did not subject this decision to the same analysis it has
subjected most earlier death penalty cases. It is understandable that the
Court did not detail the history, international opinion, current mores, or
legislative intent of the death penalty in general as they are fully addressed
in past decisions. However, the Court should have looked to current state
statutes regarding the sentencing of felony murder defendants as an indication
of contemporary society's mores. Most states204 that designated felony murder
197. Id. at 827 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Because the Florida Supreme Court rejected
critical factual findings, the dissent argued that previous Supreme Court opinions require the
case be remanded for a new sentencing hearing. Id. The dissent noted that the Court has
emphasized that death sentencing decisions must focus "on the circumstances of each individual
homicide and individual defendant." Id. (quoting Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 258).
198. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 827-28.
199. Id. at 801. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
200. 106 S. Ct. at 698 n.5. The Court basically concludes that, although there might be some
instances when state appellate fact finding should not be presumed correct because the deter-
mination turned on credibility, it does not mean that the federal habeas corpus court must find
all appellate fact finding inadequate. Id.
201. 106 S. Ct. at 707 (Blackman, J., dissenting).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 707-08.
204. Of the seventeen states identified in Enmund as potentially authorizing unconstitutional
death penalties, seven have taken steps to require Enmund findings before a death sentence
can be imposed. Defendant's Supplemental Brief, at 2 n.l, Cabana v. Bullock, 106 S. Ct. 689
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as a capital crime require the jury to find requisite intent prior to sentencing.
Even Mississippi, after Enmund and before the Court's decision in Bullock,
changed its statute to require the jury to make the requisite findings. 205
In Coker, the Court looked to state legislation to see how many states
would sentence a defendant to death for aggravated rape. 2°6 It found that
the vast majority of states did not allow death as a punishment where the
victim of a rape was not killed.20 7 And in Enmund, the majority examined
state statutes and concluded that the number of states which will not allow
the death penalty to be imposed on a felony murderer who did not have the
requisite intent, "weighs on the side of rejecting capital punishment" for
Enmund.20 s The Bullock majority should have examined state legislation to
see who is charged with the culpability findings and at what point in the
process they are made.
IV. IMPACT
The Bullock decision is problematic in two ways. First, it allows sentencing
procedures which do not afford felony murderers the same protection as
deliberate murderers. Second, it weakens the traditional role of the jury in
sentencing procedures.
Unlike the procedural safeguards it provides deliberate murderers, the
Court now permits states to maintain sentencing procedures which may
violate the eighth amendment so long as any violation is cured on appeal.
Since an appellate court, however, merely reviews the jury's decision with a
(1986) (No. 84-1236). Six states require such findings by the jury: Mississippi, South Carolina,
Georgia, North Carolina, California, and (presumably) Oklahoma. Id. One state, Arizona,
requires the trial judge to make the culpability determination. Id. Five states took the position
that evidence in the record is sufficient and that specific Enmund findings need not be made
by the judge nor jury: Indiana, Wyoming, Tennessee, Idaho, and Florida (although Florida
has on occasion remanded a case to the trial court for culpability determinations). Id. (See
Brumbley v. State, 453 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1984)). The remaining five states have not addressed
the issue: Nevada, Montana, Nebraska, South Dakota, and Connecticut. Id. See NAACP Legal
Defense and Education Fund, Death Row, U.S.A. (Aug. 1985).
This means that of the thirty-seven states with capital punishment statutes, at most eleven,
and perhaps as few as six, will allow the death penalty to be imposed where the sentencer has
not made the Enmund findings.
205. Bullock v. Lucas, 743 F.2d 244, 248 n.1 (5th Cir. 1984). According to the Mississippi
statute:
In order to return and impose a sentence of death the jury must make a written
finding of one or more of the following:
(a) The defendant actually killed;
(b) The defendant attempted to kill;
(c) The defendant intended that a killing take place;
(d) The defendant contemplated that lethal force would be employed.
Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(7) (1972).
206. 433 U.S. at 593-97.
207. Id. at 598.
208. 458 U.S. at 792-93.
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presumption of correctness 209 there is no certainty that an eighth amendment
violation will be cured. If the violation is not corrected, the system has
failed. Since Gregg, the Court has maintained that execution, in and of
itself, does not violate the eighth amendment. However, the Court has
repeatedly found that the eighth amendment recognizes a qualitative differ-
ence between the punishment of death and other types of punishments. As
a result, the Court has used a greater degree of scrutiny to review the
procedures a state uses to identify capital offenders.
210
The Court has set up procedural safeguards for the sentencing of a
deliberate murderer. It requires a state to find circumstances in aggravation
and weigh them against circumstances in mitigation. If the aggravating
circumstances, mandated by statute, are not outweighed by the mitigating
circumstances, then the murderer is determined to fit within the class of
offenders which is deserving of execution. But, before reaching the sentencing
phase of the trial, the jury has already determined that the deliberate
murderer intended to kill, attempted to kill, or intended that lethal force be
used. The deliberate murderer has already been found morally responsible
for the victim's death. The felony murderer has not.
When the Court decided that aggravating and mitigating circumstances
were necessary to narrow the class of murderers capable of being put to
death, the Court did not add to the elements of the substantive offense of
deliberate murder. Had the Bullock Court decided, as part of this narrowing
process, that the jury must find some level of personal responsibility before
pronouncing the death sentence, it would not be adding an element to the
substantive offense of felony murder. It would simply be instructing the jury
that the United States does not execute people who have not been found
morally responsible for their crime. Instead, Bullock allows the state to keep
this information from the jury at the time the felony murder defendant is
sentenced to death. The Supreme Court expects that an appellate or collateral
court, who neither saw the witnesses nor heard the testimony, will be able
to discern the defendant's level of culpability at a later time and on a paper
record. However, there is no reason to think that this can be done in every
case. Therefore, rather than tolerate the risk that a defendant will be executed
without the protection of the eighth amendment safeguards, the Court should
insist that the Enmund findings be made at the trial level and by the sentencer
in all cases. The Bullock decision weakens the effect of Enmund and treats
felony murderers differently than deliberate murderers. In so doing, it pro-
vides less constitutional protection for this class of offenders. Arguably,
felony murderers should be treated less harshly than deliberate murderers.
Bullock itself is an example of the result of a discriminatory sentencing
procedure. Bullock, an accomplice to a robbery-murder, was sentenced to
209. See Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 328. See supra notes 127-29, 200-03 and accompanying text.
210. See Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 327 (quoting California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983)).
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death without a finding of intent while his co-defendant Tucker, the actual
murderer, was sentenced to life in prison. 21 1 Indeed, more felony murderers
could be selected to receive death as a punishment because the constitutional
safeguard mandated by Enmund is moved to a later time in the criminal
justice system. As the case proceeds within the system, each succeeding court
presumes the correctness of the court below. This presumption, in the absence
of a finding that the defendant is morally culpable, is a tremendous burden.
This burden is placed on a felony murder defendant but not on a deliberate
murder defendant.
The second problem that Bullock creates is the weakening of the traditional
role of the jury in the sentencing process. The Court's decision in Spaziano
v. Florida21 2 allowed the trial judge to override the jury's recommendation
for life imprisonment. Justice Blackmun, dissenting in Bullock, distinguished
Spaziano because the Florida statute gave the ultimate sentencing decision
to the trial judge who saw all the witnesses and heard all the testimony.2 3
The Bullock majority, however, relied on Spaziano to assert the proposition
that a defendant never has a constitutional right to a jury sentencing deter-
mination. 21 4 While this may be true, it does not follow that a state, which
gives a defendant the right to a jury sentencing determination, may withhold
a constitutional sentencing limitation from jury consideration just because
an appellate court is there to prevent any resulting constitutional violation.
This is exactly the type of situation that Caldwell opposed. 215
Bullock signals a decline in the traditional view that a jury plays a
significant role in capital sentencing procedures. The jury has been found
to be a true indicator of society's current values and an expression of society's
outrage toward certain unlawful behavior. If this is the beginning of such a
decline, the procedural safeguards created by Gregg and the later cases may
well be diluted. If an appellate or collateral court may find the sentencing
limitation required by Enmund, it is possible that reviewing courts may
someday be allowed to find other aggravating or mitigating circumstances.
For this decision to have little detrimental effect, state sentencing statutes
must require the intent determination be made at the trial court level by the
sentencer. Once the finding is made, the appellate or collateral court may
assume its proper role and determine whether or not the finding is supported
by substantial evidence.
V. CONCLUSION
Bullock combines fact finding with appellate review in the same proceeding
for felony murderers. This creates a distinction between felony murderers
211. See supra note 110.
212. 468 U.S. 447, 463 n.8 (1984) (Constitution does not give defendant right to have jury
consider appropriateness of death as punishment). See Bullock, 106 S. Ct. at 697.
213. 106 S. Ct. at 705.
214. Id. at 697.
215. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
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and deliberate murderers. A deliberate murderer is assured complete consid-
eration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances while a felony murderer
is not. As a result, felony murderers will face the possibility of a death
sentence without a finding of intent. State appellate courts will find this
intent on a paper record which is presumed correct. Federal habeas corpus
courts will then review the appellate findings, again presuming they are
correct. As a result, the felony murderer is more likely to be executed without
the constitutional guarantees afforded by Gregg and its companion cases.
The conservative composition of the Court makes it very unlikely that
Bullock will be modified any time soon. Therefore, each state must take the
initiative to insure that all defendants subject to the death penalty are treated
equally. It is now the responsibility of the state to insist that the sentencer
consider a felony murderer's intent as an aggravating factor. This is the only
way in which the circumstances of the felony murder and the offender will
receive proper consideration as mandated by the Court's decisions from
Gregg to Enmund.
Mary von Mandel
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